Many industrial control systems use programmable logic controllers (PLCs) since they provide a highly reliable, off-the-shelf hardware platform. On the programming side, function blocks (FBs) are reusable components provided by the PLC supplier that can be combined to implement the required system behaviour. A higher quality system may be realized if the FBs are pre-certified to be compliant with an international standard such as IEC 61131-3. We present an approach: 1) to create complete and unambiguous FB requirements using tabular expressions; and 2) to verify the consistency and correctness of FB implementations in the PVS proof environment. We apply our approach to the examples in the informative Appendix F of the IEC 61131-3 standard. We examined the entire library of FBs and their supplied implementations described in structured text (ST) and function block diagrams (FBDs). Our approach identified issues in the informative examples, including: a) ambiguous behavioural descriptions; b) missing assumptions; and c) inconsistent implementations. We also proposed solutions to these issues.
Introduction
Many industrial control systems have replaced traditional analog equipment by components that are based upon programmable logic controllers (PLCs) to address increasing market demands for high quality [1] . Function blocks (FBs) are basic design units that implement the behaviour of a PLC, where each FB is a reusable component for building new, more sophisticated components or systems. Standards such as DO-178C [2] (in the aviation domain) and IEEE 7-4.3.2 [3] (in the nuclear domain) list acceptance criteria for mission-or safety-critical systems that practitioners need to comply with. Two important criteria are: 1) the system requirements are precise and complete; and 2) the system implementation exhibits behaviour that conforms to these requirements. In one of its supplements, DO-178C advocates the use of formal methods to construct, develop, and reason about the mathematical models of system behaviours. To this end, we present methods that support the use of formal notations for specifying the required behaviour of FBs, and for verifying that each FB (including composed FBs) complies with its requirements.
Tabular expressions [4, 5] (a.k.a., function tables or tables) have proven to be both practical and effective in formally documenting system requirements in industry [6, 7] . PVS [8] is a general purpose theorem prover that provides an integrated environment with mechanized support for writing specifications using tabular expressions and (higher-order) predicates, and for (interactively) proving that implementations satisfy the tabular requirements using sequent-style deductions. In this paper we report on using tabular expressions to formalize the requirements of FBs and on using PVS to verify their correctness (with respect to tabular requirements).
As a case study, we attempted to verify the FBs 1 listed in "Informative" Annex F of the 2003 version of IEC 61131-3 [9] as well as the FBs described in the standard itself. IEC 61131-3 is an important standard with over 20 years of use on critical systems running on PLCs. We had two reasons for choosing IEC 61131-3 for our case study. First of all, this provided a number of FBs that represent useful behaviours in a number of application domains, so our methods could be applied to FBs that we knew were representative of industrial use. Secondly, although the FBs of Annex F are not technically part of the standard as indicated by the labelled "Informative", the entire document, including all annexes, has become the de facto standard for FBs. PLC vendors have based their libraries on the FBs from Annex F, as well as those described in the body of the standard. The standard itself does not make any claim as to the completeness and appropriateness of the behaviour of FBs. In addition, no one has published a "validated and verified" version of the FBs in the standard. Thus, companies that develop mission-critical or safety-critical systems using PLCs had to qualify the behaviour of their libraries based on IEC 61131-3 (including Annex F), at considerable cost. If practitioners can use pre-defined and pre-verified FBs, then this will help raise the quality of FB-based implementations in industry without the overhead that would be required if each practitioner had to perform the verification separately.
Currently, some of the design specifications in the standard (expressed in source code) are incorrect, in that they are not what is commonly expected in practice. We believe that formal requirements of the FB behaviour, such as those provided by tabular expressions, help tool vendors and users of FBs have the same interpretations of the expected system behaviours. Also, formal descriptions are amenable to mechanized support such as PVS to verify the conformance of candidate implementations to a high-level, input-output requirements. For the purpose of this paper, we focus on FBs that are described in the more commonly used languages of structured texts (STs) and function block diagrams (FBDs). Note that two versions of IEC 61131-3 are cited here. The earlier version [9] has been in use since 2003. Most of the work reported in this paper relates to this version.
As we will see, a number of issues were uncovered in the FBs in the standard and in its informative Annex F. Our intent in the proceeding discussion is to illustrate how our methodology raised questions about some of these FBs. It is not a direct criticism of the standard, since the original mandate of the standard did not include the presentation of a pre-validated and pre-verified FB library. In fact, the standard does not attempt to define the required behaviour of each FB at the semantic level that we would expect from a requirements specification. Instead it uses code. These source programs are operational descriptions, making it hard to identify unexpected behaviour, and they are thus at an inappropriate level of abstraction for specifying requirements. Consequently, we had to provide the high-level requirements specifications based on our experience and on what we deduced was the intended behaviour of the FB. Readers may not agree with our version of the required behaviour, but we did make an honest attempt to define the behaviour that would be consistent with industrial norms. In any case, our motivation here is to demonstrate our methods, not to criticize the standard. We hope that readers will be interested that the methodology highlighted potential problems with FBs that have been in use for many years, and that this type of methodology can help us improve the quality of FB-based designs. In 2013, a new version of the standard was issued [10] , and this version did not include Annex F. Some of the FBs in the new version do still exhibit behaviour that we believe could be improved through use of this methodology.
Our approach and contributions
We now summarize our approach and contributions with reference to Fig. 1 . As shown on the left of the figure, an FB will typically have a natural language description of the block behaviour accompanied by a detailed implementation in the ST or FBD description, or in some cases both. Based upon all of this information we created a black box tabular requirements specification in PVS for the behaviour of the FB (Section 3.2). The ST and FBD implementations are formalized as predicates in PVS, again making use of tables (Section 3.1). In the case when there are two implementations for an FB, one in an FBD and the other in ST, we attempt to prove their (functional) equivalence in PVS (Section 4.2). We also use PVS to attempt to prove the consistency 2 and correctness of each implementation with respect to its FB requirements (Section 4.1).
Using our approach, we identified a number of possible issues that warrant users' attention: ambiguous behaviour (Section 5.1); possible missing input assumptions (Section 5.2); and inconsistent implementations (Section 5.3). We compare our approach and results with other related work in Section 6, and end up with some concluding remarks in Section 7. This paper extends [11] by including the following new contributions: the value of our translation is justified by the fact that the Annex F example function blocks are commonly used in industry.
• We extend the discussion on the SR block by supplying the exact definitions of: 1) what we consider should be the black-box input-output requirements table; 2) its theory of consistency; and 3) its theory of correctness (Section 5.1.2).
• We completed the verification of all FBs listed in IEC 61131-3 and found more blocks that warrant discussion: HYS- , and STACK_INT (Section 5.3.1). We present tabular requirements for these blocks and propose solutions 3 for the potential issues we uncovered using this methodology. Result Condition
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Roadmap for the running example. We specify our interpretation of the precise input-output requirement of the LIM-ITS_ALARM block using tabular expressions (Section 3.2). To verify its FBD implementation, we first formalize it in PVS (Section 3.1.5), then we verify its consistency and correctness (Section 4.1) with respect to the tabular requirement. Furthermore, we report any potential issues uncovered regarding this block (Section 5.2.3).
Tabular expressions
Tabular expressions [12, 13, 4, 5] are a proven and effective approach to describing conditionals and relations, and they are thus ideal for documenting many system requirements. They are arguably easier to comprehend and to maintain than conventional mathematical expressions. Reference [14] presents a relational semantics for tabular expressions which covers the most common types of tabular expressions used in software practice. Recently, reference [15] presented a new semantics for tabular expressions by using indexing to decouple the appearance of a tabular expression from its semantics. Tabular expressions have also been proven to be of great help both in inspections [7] and in testing and verification [16] .
For our purpose of capturing the input-output requirements of function blocks in IEC 61131-3, tabular expressions of the form shown in Fig. 3 are appropriate. These tabular expressions are called horizontal condition tables (HCTs) . The input domain is partitioned into condition rows in the left column(s), while rows in the right column(s), inside double borders, denote the corresponding output results. Rows in the input columns may be divided to specify sub-conditions. We may interpret the tabular structure in Fig. 3 as a list of "if-then-else" statements, without the sequence implications of the "if-then-else" construct. This is shown in the right part of the figure. Each row defines the input circumstances under which the output F is bound to a particular result value. For example, the first row corresponds to the predicate (C 1 ∧ C 1.1 ⇒ F = RES 1 ), and so on.
In documenting input-output behaviours using HCTs as illustrated in Fig. 3 , we need to reason about their completeness and disjointness. Completeness ensures that there is an output specified for every combination of inputs -the rows cover all input combinations, i.e., if we suppose that there are no sub-conditions, (C 1 ∨ C 2 ∨ · · · ∨ C n ≡ TRUE). Disjointness ensures that the rows do not overlap, e.g., (i = j ⇒ ¬(C i ∧ C j ), i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}). Similar constraints apply to the sub-conditions, if any.
PVS language and prover
The Prototype Verification System (PVS) [8] was developed by the Computer Science Lab at SRI International as an interactive environment for writing specifications and conducting proofs. PVS consists of a specification language, predefined theories, a parser, a type checker, a theorem prover which supports several decision procedures, a symbolic model checker, pre-developed libraries, and utilities and documentation with examples in different application areas.
The PVS specification language is based on classical, typed higher-order logic. The base types include uninterpreted types and built-in types such as the Booleans. The type-constructors include functions, sets, tuples, records, enumerations, and inductively-defined (or coinductively-defined) abstract data types. In addition, users can adopt predicate subtypes and dependent types to introduce constraints to greatly increase the expressiveness and naturalness of specifications. But the expense is that these constrained types may generate proof obligations called Type Correctness Conditions (TCCs) during typechecking. In many cases, these generated TCCs can be discharged automatically by the theorem prover. PVS specifications are organized into theories that may include imported theorems, assumptions, definitions, axioms, lemmas, and goal theorems. Furthermore, the theories can be parameterized with constants, types, and theory instances. Definitions are conservative, e.g., subtype TCC generated with dependent types and termination TCC generated with recursive function definitions. PVS expressions support the arithmetic and logical operators, function application, lambda abstraction, and quantifiers, within a natural syntax. Tabular expressions are also provided with automated checks for disjointness and completeness. A prelude is included in PVS to provide over 1000 useful definitions and lemmas. The NASA PVS Library is also a collection of formal developments contributed and maintained by the NASA Langley Formal Methods Team [17] .
The built-in theorem prover provides a collection of powerful proof commands to conduct propositional and quantifier rules, equality, and arithmetic formal reasoning under user guidance. Proof commands can be combined to form higher-level proof strategies. The PVS specification language is designed to work with the prover so that the inference mechanisms exploit the type information of a defined term and most of the generated TCCs are automatically discharged by the prover. To facilitate debugging of proofs, the PVS proof checker allows any proof step to be undone. It also permits modification of specification over the course of a proof. Proof scripts can be edited and rerun to support proof maintenance, allowing many similar theorems to be proved efficiently and adjusted economically.
We chose the PVS theorem prover to formalize the input-output requirements of function blocks primarily because it supports the syntax and semantics of tables (Section 2.3.1). In particular, for each table that is syntactically valid, PVS automatically generates its associated healthiness conditions of completeness and disjointness as TCCs. We have expertise built from past experience in applying PVS to check requirements and designs in the nuclear domain [6] that gave us confidence in using the toolset, and for modelling real-time behaviour we reused parts of the PVS theories from [18, 19] . Our ongoing work on proving properties of real-time function blocks that consider timing tolerances also relies on the same set of theories. Nonetheless, the techniques presented in this paper are transferable to other theorem provers that support reasoning in higher-order logic, although checks of completeness and disjointness may then have to be manually encoded or a generator for the properties would have to be developed.
The function blocks in Annex F of IEC 61131-3 [9] involve only simple expressions using linear integer or real arithmetic and in our experience, when these constraints are provable, the table-related TCCs generated were typically automatically discharged by PVS's built-in default strategies. Alternatively, these table correctness conditions can be automatically discharged by an SMT solver, using the solver's theories for linear integer and real arithmetic. However, such verification may not be as convenient as in PVS, since one will need to manually encode these constraints for each table in the SMT solver, unless an existing tool that supports automated generation of correctness conditions (e.g., [20] ) is chosen to create the tables. Further, when handling additional user-defined or library blocks that involve nonlinear arithmetic, the table's correctness conditions may be undecidable by an SMT solver. In this case, the PVS environment allows us to interactively prove these conditions.
Support for function tables in PVS
The PVS specification language provides two alternative built-in constructs for specifying function tables: COND and TABLE. They are semantically equivalent to a series of IF-THEN-ELSE-ENDIF statements. The use of COND and TABLE causes PVS to generate the proof obligations on disjointness and completeness to guarantee that the function table is well-defined.
These can often be discharged automatically using the built-in proof strategies in PVS, i.e., (COND-COVERAGE-TCC) and (COND-DISJOINT-TCC). When the table cannot be automatically proved as well-defined, some useful feedback is returned.
However, for readability, it is more advisable for users to adopt the TABLE construct, which will be translated into the equivalent COND construct in PVS for typechecking and proofs. Later in this paper (Section 5.2.2), we will discuss an issue in which the ST implementation supplied by IEC 61131-3 is formalized as a PVS table but the table fails the proof on the TCC of disjointness. The syntactic constructs that we use the most are IF-THEN-ELSE-ENDIF predicates and tables. An example of using tabular expressions to specify and verify the Darlington Nuclear Shutdown System (SDS) in PVS can be found in [6] . 
Type correctness conditions
We briefly review failed TCCs that we encountered in our verification process. PVS automatically generates TCCs as proof obligations, which often can be automatically discharged, if they are provable, using the default proof strategies. However, in cases where they are too complicated to be discharged automatically, human interaction is required to guide the prover. Unproven TCCs often help users reveal issues (e.g., incompleteness, non-disjointness, ill-definedness, etc.) that can be traced back to the original specifications. One may choose to continue other proofs for the same specification while bypassing unproven TCCs, but until all TCCs have been discharged, a specification is not considered as type-correct, and lemmas and theorems that depend on theses unproven TCCs are considered provisional.
PVS checks the completeness and disjointness properties for a function 
In PVS, function f can be specified as a function table using either the COND construct or the Since constraints can be imposed on the types in a PVS specification, subtype TCCs are generated for expressions whose types are defined using the predicate subtype notation (e.g., positive real numbers posreal). It makes very explicit and intuitive statements about the domains and ranges of functions, thereby contributing to the clarity of the PVS specification. The price paid is that it requires theorem proving to prove that expressions satisfy the constraints attached to types. Consider a general PVS function F , which is defined as:
with the domain type constrained by predicate P and range type constrained by predicate Q . Whenever a function f is invoked, subtype TCCs are generated to ensure that, the output has to satisfy predicate constraint Q and the input has to satisfy predicate constraint P . Division is a particular instance of this problem.
As an example, consider a function g(x) with a real parameter x:
To model g in PVS, we use the built-in division operator (LHS in Fig. 5 ). For g to be well-defined, all expressions involved in its definition must be well-defined, i.e., the denominator x must be non-zero. Such a well-definedness constraint is formulated automatically by PVS as a TCC (RHS in Fig. 5 ).
There are other categories of TCCs that are automatically generated in PVS: existence TCCs and termination TCCs. Existence TCCs are generated for expressions whose types are declared as non-empty. Termination TCCs are generated to ensure that recursive functions always terminate for all possible inputs by requiring a well-founded measure to strictly decrease on each recursive calls. More precisely, recursive functions must be specified with a measure, that is a function whose signature 5 We show only the generated TCCs for function f_COND, as the same TCCs are generated for f_TABLE.
matches that of the recursive function, but with range type the domain of the order relation, which defaults to < on nat or ordinal.
Proofs in PVS
PVS has a powerful interactive proof checker to perform sequent-style deductions. The basic structure of the underlying calculus in PVS is a sequent [21] . Syntactically, a PVS sequent is showed as:
where P i , i = 1, 2, . . . , m are antecedent formulas, Q j , j = 1, 2, . . . , n are consequent formulas, and denotes entailment.
Where the context is empty (i.e., no antecedent), may be dropped. The antecedents are combined by conjunctives while consequents are connected by disjunctives. Thus, the above PVS sequent is equivalent to the following expression in predicate logic 6 :
The final goal of a PVS sequent is to determine whether at least one of its consequents is a logical consequence of its antecedents. In an editor panel of the PVS prover, a sequent is displayed as follows:
.. {n} Qn
A sequent can be discharged only if one of the following three cases applies: 1) FALSE occurs in the antecedents; 2) TRUE occurs in the consequents; or 3) the formula P occurs in both the antecedents and the consequents [19] . A PVS sequent may be discharged by splitting it into sub-goals and by proving all of these sub-goals. The prover maintains a proof tree, and the final goal is to discharge each of its leaves by invoking relevant proof commands. In practice, it is useful to decompose a complex problem into smaller ones, and to formulate and prove each of these subproblems as a lemma. For example, to verify the overall correctness of the LIMITS_ALARM block (Section 4.1), we formulate the correctness conditions of its three output variables (i.e., QL, Q, and QH) as separate lemmas and conduct independent proofs.
Our justification for decomposing requirements by their outputs is two-fold. First, output variables in our proposed requirements tables do not depend upon each other. As discussed in Section 2.4, our requirements model describes idealized behaviour with an arbitrarily small clock-tick. At each discrete time instant, outputs are produced simultaneously as the inputs are updated. This means that the value of each output of a function block depends solely on those of the inputs. Second, all input-output requirements tables that we propose are completely functional. This claim is supported by the fact that all our proposed function tables are provably complete and disjoint, meaning that at any time instant, exactly one value can be produced for each output. Consequently, it is always possible to separate the definition of an output by projecting onto its relevant range of values. For example, consider any input types I 1 and I 2 and output types O 1 and O 2 , then we declare
where REQ represents the overall requirements function, and req 1 and req 2 represent, respectively, the requirements for the first output and second output, then for input values i 1 ∈ I 1 and i 2 ∈ I 2 , we have
where π 1 and π 2 are operators for, respectively, the first projection and second projection. This example can be generalized to arbitrary numbers of inputs and outputs.
Consequently, for each output, we are able to: 1) specify a separate function table that characterizes its relationship with the inputs; and 2) prove its correctness separately.
Modelling time in PVS
As PLCs are widely used in real-time systems, the modelling of time is a critical aspect in our formalization. We consider a discrete-time model, where a time series consists of equally distributed time samplings, or "ticks". [18] from [22] . It represents the type TIME in IEC 61131-3. In the real world, the sampling frequency is usually different from the clock tick frequency, i.e., the clock tick frequency should be significantly larger than the sampling frequency. In the software domain, all the actions occurring at the sampling times can be captured at the corresponding clock ticks. To approximate the continuous time model, the value of δ may be arbitrarily small.
As a result, we define a Time theory in PVS:
The constant delta_t is a positive real number. We define two type synonyms: time as the set of non-negative real numbers, and tick as the set of non-negative multiples of delta_t. We will perform operations on tick [18] : e.g., init (the very first tick) and pre(t) (the tick preceding t, given that init(t) does not hold).
We define a characteristic predicate init which is TRUE only at the initial tick t 0 :
It is important to explicitly identify the initial values of internal or output variables of FBs in PLC-based control system. Given a time instant t, we use rank(t) to denote the ordinal of t in a discrete time setting.
For example, time instant 8.8 is the 4th tick given that delta_t = 2.2.
However, we choose to adopt the notion of real-valued ticks, rather than their corresponding integer ranks, for specifying function blocks (and their properties) as they more closely correspond to the sampling times in reality. In other words, the notion of ticks is more meaningful for the user to manipulate: e.g., for timer blocks, an output that denotes the elapsed time should be measured in real-valued units rather than integer ranks. However, given some fixed delta_t, the set of real-valued ticks is isomorphic to its set of integer ranks. Consequently, proving lemmas or theorems in both domains is equally complex.
As PVS requires that all functions are total, to define the pre operator, we need a subtype noninit_elem that denotes the set of ticks starting from t 1 (i.e., excluding t 0 ):
Using noninit_elem, the pre operator is defined as follows:
An important yet simple proposition we use in our model to prove some desired properties is an induction scheme over time ticks [19] . It states that a predicate P holds at all ticks if (a) P holds at the initial tick t 0 ; and (b) for any t > 0, the fact that P holds at tick t n−1 implies that P holds at tick t n . The formalization of this induction scheme is as follows:
We consider most FBs listed in IEC 61131-3 as time-dependent. Each FB is formalized as a theory in PVS, parameterized by the constant time interval delta_t and by importing our timing theory presented in this section.
Formalizing standard functions and function blocks using tabular expressions
We need to tailor our approach depending on the language(s) used to describe the required behaviour and the implemented behaviour of the FBs. In this case we have tailored our approach to deal with the languages used in IEC 61131-3. In many cases, IEC 61131-3 uses both ST and FBD to describe a single function block. However, both ST and FBD are informal, implementation-oriented notations, and they are thus not suitable for capturing a precise input-output relationship that is both complete and disjoint. Moreover, it is not possible to formally establish that these implementations are correct (i.e., consistent with the input-output requirement), since the required behaviour of the FBs in the standard and in Annex F is defined using natural language or not defined at all. We present a formal approach to define IEC 61131-3 standard functions and function blocks using tabular expressions and PVS. For each function block, we: 1) translate the supplied ST or FBD implementation into predicates in PVS (Section 3.1); and 2) capture its input-output requirement using tabular expressions in PVS (Section 3.2). Consequently, we have a unified, formal framework to verify the correctness of function blocks (Section 4).
Formalizing IEC 61131-3 function block implementations
We perform formalization at the level of standard functions, basic function blocks (FBs), and composite FBs. Similar to [23] , we formulate each standard function or function block as a predicate, characterizing its input-output relation.
Standard functions
IEC 61131-3 defines eight groups of standard functions, including: 1) data type conversion; 2) numerical; 3) arithmetic; 4) bit-string; 5) selection and comparison; 6) character string; 7) time and date types; and 8) enumerated data types. In general, we formalize the behaviour of a standard function f as a relation (i.e., Boolean function or predicate):
where the symbol denotes that function f is formalized using relation (or predicate) R. Predicate R represents the specification of function f with input vector i and output vector o, by characterizing the precise relation on the m inputs and the n outputs of function f . Our formalization covers both timed and untimed behaviours of standard functions.
As an example, consider function WEIGH (Annex F.1), which takes as inputs a gross weight gross_weight (a word encoding in Binary-Coded Decimal (BCD)) and a tare weight tare_weight (an integer), and returns the net weight net_weight (a BCD-encoded word). The standard supplies a one-line ST code program for the implementation of where INT_TO_BCD and BCD_TO_INT are PVS functions, whose names are deliberately chosen to match those in the standard, that formalize the corresponding conversions and SUB is the standard subtraction function. We use bit vectors supported by PVS to model words, and follow the standard rules of performing conversions between BCD-encoded words and integers. However, as our modelling is performed at the level of requirements, we do not consider implementation issues such as arithmetic overflows. Therefore, unless the input or output values are explicitly bounded like in the case of WEIGH, we use mathematical, unbounded integers or reals to model input and output values.
Nonetheless, as we stated earlier in the paper, since the focus of the standard is primarily on the notations used to describe the FB implementations, the standard does not include precise descriptions of the required behaviour of each FB. So as a demonstration of our approach, based on our experience and whatever we can deduce from the standard itself, we propose a formal requirements specification for the FB. More precisely, in the example above, we make the requirements of WEIGH and explicitly define the inputs domain. Of course, readers may disagree with our requirements specification and may have another in mind. This is quite usual in practice. The essential point here is that the requirements behaviour needs to be precise, and we did not make up these requirements behaviours simply to generate discrepancies between the requirements and implementations.
To complete this section we also discuss another standard function ADD (i.e., "+"). This function is stateless, and it may be used as an internal component of other FBs, such as LIMITS_ALARM (see Fig. 2 ), which has the obvious formalization:
Incorporating the output value OUT as part of the predicate parameters makes it possible to formalize basic FBs with internal states, or composite FBs. The predicate formalizing ADD can be reused to produce more complex composite FBs. For basic FBs with no internal states, we formalize them as function compositions of their internal blocks. As a result, we also support a version of ADD that returns an integer value:
The functional formalization of ADD is used to discharge a consistency proof using instantiation, if an ADD block is one of the internal components. 
Basic function blocks
A basic function block (FB) is an abstraction component that consists of standard functions. When all internal components of a basic FB are functions, and there are no intermediate values to be stored, we formalize the output as the result of a functional composition of the internal functions.
As an example in Fig. 6 ., consider the SR block, which implements a set-dominant latch (a.k.a., flip-flop). Block SR takes as inputs a Boolean set flag S 1 and a Boolean reset flag R, and returns a Boolean output Q 1 . The value of Q 1 is fed back as another input of block SR itself. The value of Q 1 remains TRUE as long as the set flag S 1 is enabled. Q 1 is reset to FALSE not only when the reset flag is enabled, but also when the set flag is disabled (so it cannot dominate the output result). Otherwise, Q 1 stays unchanged. There should be a delay between the value of Q 1 which is computed and passed to the next execution cycle. We formalize this by adding the explicit unit delay block z −1 and conjoining predicates for the internal blocks. The formalization of the delay block will be introduced in Section 5.1.2. IEC 61131-3 uses a circle (e.g., the upper input to conjunction block in Fig. 6 ) to negate the value of Boolean input signal. We explicitly replace such circle with a negation block wherever it occurs.
We formalize composite FBs in a similar manner.
Composite function blocks
Each composite FB contains as components standard functions, basic FBs, or other pre-developed composite FBs. For example, LIMITS_ALARM (Fig. 2) is a composite FB consisting of standard functions and two instances of the pre-developed composite FB HYSTERESIS. Our formalization of each component as a predicate results in compositionality: a predicate that formalizes a composite FB is obtained by taking the conjunction of those that formalize its components. IEC 61131-3 uses ST or FBD, or both in the case that component FBs are described using different languages, to describe the behaviour of composite FBs. At this point we should note that predicates that formalize basic or composite FBs represent their black-box input-output relations. Since we use function tables in PVS to specify these predicates, their behaviours are deterministic. This allows us to easily compose their behaviours using logical conjunction. The conjunction of deterministic components is functionally deterministic.
Formalizing composite FB implementations: ST
As discussed in Section 2.1, in general it is not possible to translate an arbitrary ST implementation into its equivalent FBD implementation. Instead, for the purpose of our verification in PVS, we develop a limited set of translation rules that suffices to translate the ST implementations that are supplied by Annex F of IEC 61131-3 [9] into their equivalent expressions in PVS. This step of formalization in PVS allows us to verify the correctness of ST implementations against their input-output requirements (Section 3.2).
In this section, we discuss our ST-to-PVS translation in four phases: 1) state the challenge, scope of translation, and input assumptions; 2) provide an overview of translation; 3) provide a list of formal rules of translations; and 4) illustrate our translation rules via a number of examples.
ST-to-PVS: challenge, scope of translation, and input assumptions
The main challenge of using PVS to formalize ST is that these two languages belong to two distinct paradigms. The ST programming language is an imperative notation, whereas the PVS specification language is a functional notation. For example, an IF-THEN-ELSE statement in ST is meant to perform conditional updates on the state (i.e., output or local variables), whereas an IF-THEN-ELSE expression in PVS is side-effect-free and returns a value (corresponding to the satisfying branch condition).
Nonetheless, our ultimate goal is to use only function blocks that are listed in the Annex of the standard [9] to illustrate our proposed approach. Consequently, our intention is not to formalize any arbitrary ST code whose syntax conforms with the standard. Instead, for the purpose of our verification, our rules of ST-to-PVS translation are designed to only handle the syntactic constructs of the ST language that are exploited in Annex F. That is, constructs that are supported by the ST language but not used in the Annex of the standard [9] (e.g., CASE statement, WHILE and REPEAT loops, etc.) Nonetheless, the value of our translation should be justified by the fact that the Annex F example function blocks are commonly used in industry. In other words, our translation rules should be able to handle many other similar function blocks outside the scope of Annex F [9].
For our ST-to-PVS translation, there are two primary assumptions about the input ST code. Both of the following assumptions are satisfied by all function blocks listed in Annex F [9] . • Type correctness. Each ST code is assumed to be type-correct: e.g., no references to unknown function blocks in variable declarations, no references to undeclared variables, no references to unknown formal parameters of a function in its invocation, etc. The PVS type system may be exploited to type-check the ST code, because if the source ST code is not type-correct, then neither will its corresponding formalized PVS theory. However, for the purpose of tracing type errors in the original code, if any, adopting a third-party ST programming tool is more appropriate.
• Single assignment. Each output or local variable in the body of the ST code gets assigned at most once. This will allow us to formalize each sequential composition operator (;) in ST as a logical conjunction (∧) in PVS. As far as the formalization of function blocks in Annex F [9] is concerned, this assumption is always met. However, to relax this assumption, we will need to introduce a mechanism of building the dependency graph of variable assignments and, when it is acyclic, introduce auxiliary variables on the PVS side to impose the topological order.
Given the above assumptions, and the richness of the specification language and supported libraries of PVS, our ST-to-PVS translation is reasonably straightforward. Our translation rules shown below, although presented in a formal way, are still meant as guidance for users who want to translate the ST code manually into PVS. To adapt them for automation, some further context-sensitive analysis needs to be performed beforehand. Extension to the full coverage of ST syntax, or to the automation of these rules, is outside the scope of this paper.
ST-to-PVS: an overview
Our strategy of translation is to map each complete ST program (i.e., with variable declarations and function block body) into a PVS theory. More precisely, we map (unconditional, conditional, or iterative) variable assignments into PVS predicates (Boolean functions) that encode the intended state effect as variable constraints. Let J_K : ST PVS denote our translation function that maps ST code to PVS expressions. Since we do not intend to handle the full ST syntax, the translation function is declared as partial. Fig. 7 presents an overview of our ST-to-PVS translation. On the LHS of Fig. 7 we have the complete definition of a function block named F , declared with an input v 1 (of type T 1 ), an output v 2 (of type T 2 ). There is also a local variable v 3 whose type is declared to match that of the output v 2 . We assume that: 1) a standard function f is declared with parameters p 1 and p 2 and a return value of type T 2 ; and 2) a function block G is declared with parameters p 3 and p 4 and an output value of type T 2 ; 3) types of expressions e 1 , e 2 , e 3 , and e 4 match those of, respectively, p 1 , p 2 , p 3 , and p 4 ; and 4) e 5 and e 6 are Boolean expressions.
An example translation
The body of function block F is defined as a sequential composition (denoted by a semicolon ;) of three programming statements: 1) assign to v 3 the return value of invoking the standard function f ; 2) invoke the function block G; and 3) assign to v 2 , depending on the values of e 5 and e 6 . In both cases of invoking a standard function and a function block, the order in which argument values are passed is flexible: names of the formal parameters (e.g., p 1 , p 2 , etc.) are specify explicitly to bind those argument values. Moreover, there is a distinction between invocations of a standard function and of a function block: the former is an expression (a R-value), whereas the latter is a statement whose output must be retrieved in a later statement (e.g., G.Q ).
On the RHS of Fig. 7 we have a PVS theory 7 F that formalizes the function block F defined on the LHS. As our translation is recursive, we write JT 1 K, JT 2 K, Je 1 K, Je 2 K, etc. to denote the corresponding, equivalent PVS expressions. In the following, we summarize (part of) our translation strategy as exemplified in Fig. 7 :
• For readability, we retain names of the function block and all its declared variables.
• The theory is always parameterized by an arbitrary clock tick interval delta_t, which is used to instantiate the imported timing theory (Section 2.4).
• We formalize all ST (input, output, and local) variables as time-dependent logical variables in PVS (i.e., functions with the tick domain). However, we treat the parameter types of standard functions and function blocks differently in PVS. We formalize ST function blocks as input-output relations whose parameters are time-dependent (i.e., function blocks constrain inputs and outputs over time). On the other hand, parameters of standard functions are "untimed" (i.e., they are simple values instead of functions). All ST input and output variables are translated into global variables in PVS, so that they are implicitly universally quantified. On the other hand, local variables and return values from function invocations are translated into dummy variables of an existential quantification, so that they are hidden inside the function block.
• The function block body is formalized as a relation (i.e., Boolean function) which constrains the list of input and output variables over all discrete time ticks. The name of the relation has the _st_impl suffix to indicate that it is translated from some ST code.
• We define the input-output relation using a logical implication.
-The antecedent constrains output values of function block invocations, so that their output values can be referenced in the consequence. For each invocation that occurs in the context of some (nested) conditional branch, we guard it using an implication (e.g., the invocation of function block G is guarded by ¬Je 5 K ∧ Je 6 K). The guard (or the antecedent) may be used to prove that the input assumptions of the function block are satisfied upon its invocation.
For example, in ST we may invoke the HYSTERESIS block under the condition EPS > 0, and we formalize it as the constraint EPS > 0 ⇒ HYSTERESIS(. . . ) in PVS.
-In the consequence, as output and local variables may be initialized, we use a universal quantification (over discrete tick values) to distinguish cases of the initial tick and non-initial ticks. At the initial tick, we constrain the values of those output and local variables that are explicitly initialized in the ST code; if no variables are explicitly initialized, the constraint is TRUE. At non-initial ticks, we constrain the value of each output variable according to how it is updated in the ST code. For example, the value of v 2 at time t, where ¬ init(t), is equal to either: 1) the value of v 3 at time t if Je 5 K holds; 2) the value of Q at time t if ¬Je 5 K ∧ Je 6 K holds 8 ; or 3) itself at the previous time tick if
ST-to-PVS: formal rules of translation
In this section, we provide the list of translation rules that is sufficient for translating ST code supplied by Annex F [9] into PVS.
Notational convention For clarity, we typeset ST constructs in the code style (e.g., a + b), and PVS constructs in the math style (e.g., a + b). As our translation is recursive, when the translation of an ST construct (e.g., If-THEN-ELSE statement) involves the translation of its components (e.g., branching conditions, body statements, etc.), say e, then we write JeK to denote the translated PVS expression for e. Moreover, as partly illustrated in Fig. 7 , we adopt the following conventions: 1) e, e 1 , e 2 , etc., denote ST expressions; 2) v, v 1 , v 2 , etc., denote ST variables; 3) f , g, h, etc. denote standard functions; 4) F , G, H , etc. denote function block names; 5) T , T 1 , T 2 , etc. denote ST types; 6) S, S 1 , S 2 , etc., denote ST statements; and 7) i denotes a loop counter.
Translation context Our translation function J_K often needs to carry around context information from the translation of one component to another. First, since all ST variables are mapped into time-dependent variables in PVS, when generating a reference to a variable v, we need to determine either to refer to: 1) its entirety v as a timed sequence; 2) its value v(0) at the initial tick; or 3) its value v(t) at some non-initial tick t. Second, since for each output variable we need to infer its intended update as constraints, the current translation may need to know the target variable in order to make the corresponding inference. As a result, given that v is the target variable, and that t ∈ { init, ninit, seq } is the context for variable references, we write J_K t v to denote the corresponding translation. We drop the context when it is not necessary for the translation in question to proceed. As an example, we write J_K seq for translating the invocation of a function block, where its arguments are expected to be time-dependent (i.e., timed sequences). In this example, the target variable is irrelevant and is thus dropped.
Context-sensitive analysis To assist our translation, we often need to extract information from the ST code fragment under consideration. For example, given a statement (e.g., the function block body as a sequential composition), we may extract the list of function block invocations that it makes. Furthermore, for those invocations, we need to extract the exact conditions where they occur and guard them accordingly (e.g., see Fig. 7 where the invocation of function block G is properly guarded).
As another example, we may calculate the write set of a given statement (i.e, the set of variables that appear at the RHS Jv 1 : Table 2  Tables 7-6  Tables 8-10 of assignments), so as to determine if a variable has already been written. Tasks of such kind are standard and we do not address them in detail. Table 1 presents the translation rules for function block definitions. The definition of each function block consists of two parts: variable declarations and body definition (denoted as S 1 ). Without loss of generality, we consider the case where the function block declares one variable from each of the categories (i.e., input, output, and local).
Translation rule: function block definition
As illustrated in Fig. 7 , each function block defined in ST is mapped into a PVS theory that has a matching name, and instantiates our timing theory (Section 2.4) with an arbitrarily small, positive clock tick interval delta_t. We delegate the translation of each input or output declaration in ST to Table 2 .
The ST function block body S 1 is mapped into the PVS relation F _st_impl that constrains values of its parameters: the list of inputs and outputs. Inside the definition of this relation, we use an existential quantification to hide: 1) the list of local variables (i.e., v 3 ); and 2) return values from function invocations. For 2), we use Q (of type T Q ) to denote the list of return values that are referenced in S 1 , if any.
In the case of function block invocations, as discussed, we model each function block F as a relation (a Boolean function) on the lists of inputs (i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i n ) and outputs ( Q ), and each input or output is time-dependent and thus modelled as a timed sequence. In the case where the computation of output values depends on those of local variables, as mentioned above, we translate the relevant local variables into dummy variables of the corresponding existential quantification (see Fig. 7 ). As a result, the translated argument values are expected to be timed sequences (i.e., Je 1 K seq , . . . , Je n K seq ). As illustrated in Fig. 7 , we use matching names 9 to capture values of outputs, so that in the same scope of context, these output variables may be referenced to define the constraints at both initial and non-initial time ticks. In the case where an invocation occurs within some (nested) conditional branch, we need to add an antecedent accordingly to guard the invocation. Inferring the exact antecedent to guard each invocation is an example of the context-sensitive analysis mentioned above, and we omit its details here. In the case of the initial time tick, we constrain values of variables according to their specified initial values, if specified. 9 Where multiple function blocks (e.g., FB1 and FB2) have outputs with the same name (e.g., Q ), we resolve the ambiguity by adding their names as prefixes (i.e., FB1_Q and FB1_Q ). 10 We may choose to specify an initial value for some uninitialized variable, but this is beyond the scope of the translation. 
Since each ST variable is time-dependent in our execution context of function blocks, we parameterize the PVS type JT K (translated from the ST type t) by discrete time ticks (Section 2.4). At the level of variable declarations, the translation does not consider whether or not an initial value is specified in the source ST code. Instead, such information is considered at the higher level of function block definitions (Table 1) , where the context init is passed for translating the specified initial value (i.e., JeK init ). Table 3 presents the translation rules for types supported by ST. We categorize these types into four kinds: 1) primitive types (integers, reals, Booleans); 2) built-in types (e.g., words, time, etc.); 3) user-defined function blocks (e.g., F ); and 4) arrays. For primitive types, we can easily find the direct corresponding types in PVS. For built-in types, we import relevant theories to support their operations (e.g., bit vectors bvec from the bv prelude library, tick in Section 2.4, etc.). For a function block F that is user-defined, we simply reuse its name, assuming that its full definition is translated into a PVS theory.
Translation rule: types
The only structured type that we need for the purpose of Annex F [9] is that of arrays, which is also directly supported in PVS. The ARRAY type in PVS is essentially a function with a contiguous subset of integers for the domain and a proper range type, but the associated TCCs, e.g., validity of indices, are automatically generated by the prover. The operator subrange is supported by PVS to denote an integer range with specified lower and upper bounds. Presumably, e 1 and e 2 should be integer expressions, which is guaranteed by our assumption of input type-correctness. As the size of an array does not change at runtime, values of e 1 and e 2 must be available initially. 
ST statement PVS expression Side condition
Sequential composition
by any of the body statements S i (0 ≤ i ≤ n), then we return ⊥. Otherwise, to correspond to the execution semantics of the ST IF-THEN-ELSE statement, each guard in PVS is defined as the conjunction of: 1) the translated value of the corresponding branching condition (e.g., Je 1 K ninit ); and 2) translated values of all branching conditions that are checked before it (e.g., Je 0 K ninit ). We use as a meta-operator to denote the conjunction of a sequence of expressions occurring in PVS.
The resulting PVS table in Table 5 is a list of guarded values. If any of the body statements (S 0 , S 1 , . . . , S n ) contain further nested IF-THEN-ELSE statements, then we will have nested table expressions in the resulting PVS, which are allowed. If the ELSE part is missing from the source ST code, then there is no change on the value of v. Accordingly, we specify v(pre(t)) as the return value in the PVS table: it is as if v were assigned to its value at the previous tick. We instantiate the for function by passing: 1) the translated type of v (i.e., JT K); 2) the translated lower and upper bounds (i.e., Je 1 K ninit and Je 2 K ninit ); 3) the initial value of v, which is its value at the previous time tick (i.e., v(pre(t))); and 4) an anonymous lambda function which encodes the loop body. The lambda function encodes the loop body by taking the loop counter i (within the specified bounds) and the accumulated value of v, and by specifying that the value of v is constrained according to the list of guarded values inferred from S 1 (i.e., JSK v ). Table 7 presents the translation for the sequential composition of statements in ST. As discussed, when translating statements, we aim to retrieve the list of guarded values for the context variable v. Due to our single-assignment assumption, it is not allowed to have v assigned for more than once in the function block body. Consequently, when given a sequential composition of two statements S 1 and S 2 , exactly one of them will return the list of guarded values for the context variable v. Tables 8-10 present the translation rules for ST expressions, where we use ⊕ 1 to denote a unary (numerical, relational, or logical) operator, and ⊕ 2 for a binary operator. As we have seen so far, each translation of an expression requires a context of variable reference (i.e., init, ninit, or seq). We use ρ to denote the value of this context.
Translation rule: expressions
We consider four categories of expressions: 1) variable referencing; 2) literal expressions; 3) standard function invocations; and 4) operations. Referencing function block output In the case of variable referencing (Table 8) , we may refer to a declared variable of a simple type or of an array type, or to an output variable of some function block that is invoked previously. The treatment of each kind of these variables is similar: depending on the given context ρ of the variable reference (init, ninit, or seq), we generate the references accordingly. In the case of array indexing, we propagate the variable reference context ρ to the translation of its specified index.
Furthermore, the sequential execution of the source ST code makes it possible to reuse the latest value of a variable that is assigned in a previous statement. To formalize this, we need to make a case distinction when the context ρ is ninit: if the variable v has not yet been written yet, then we write v(pre(t)) to denote its value from the previous time tick; otherwise, we should refer to its latest value at the current time tick (i.e., v(t)).
In the case of literal expressions (Table 9) , integer literals (e.g., 2), real literals (e.g., 2.0), and Boolean literals (e.g., TRUE) can all be directly used in PVS. However, when the context of variable reference suggests that a timed sequence is expected (e.g., in the context of some function block invocation), then we use the lambda expression to create a constant timed sequence.
In the case of operations (Table 10) , for all the unary and binary numerical expressions (e.g., 1 + 2), relational expressions (e.g., EPS > 0), and logical expressions (e.g., e1 & e2), we can find the obvious corresponding operators in PVS. To translate the operands, we propagate the given context ρ (e.g., JeK ρ ). The case of translating the invocation of a standard function f is also straightforward: pass the translated argument values in the order that is defined in the corresponding standard function definition in PVS.
ST-to-PVS: applications of translation rules
Our example translation in Fig. 7 , though informative, is nevertheless contrived. We provide two complete example translations that are applied to the HYSTERESIS and DELAY function blocks from Annex F [9] in Appendix A. First, Fig. 37 shows the formalized ST implementation for the HYSTERESIS block (Fig. 18) . This example illustrates the generation of nested PVS tables, mapped from the nested IF-THEN-ELSE statement in the source ST code. Second, Fig. 38 shows the formalized ST implementation for the DELAY block (Fig. 22) . This example illustrates the use of a loop, and the list of generated "guarded values" for local and output variables in the context of non-initial ticks. 
Formalizing composite FB implementations: FBD
To illustrate the case of formalizing an FBD implementation supplied by IEC 61131-3, let us consider the following FBD of a composite FB and its formalizing predicate. To describe the overall behaviour of the above composite FB, we take advantage of our formalization being compositional. In other words, we formalize a composite FB by existentially quantifying over the list of its inter-connectives (i.e., w 1 , w 2 and w 3 ), such that the conjunction of predicates that formalize the internal components hold.
As a more concrete example, consider the FBD implementation of the LIMITS_ALARM block that was introduced in Section 2.1 (Fig. 2) . In Fig. 9 , the predicate LIMITS_ALARM_IMPL formalizes the FBD implementation of LIMITS_ALARM (Section 2.1). We observe that predicate LIMITS_ALARM_IMPL, as well as those for the internal components, all take a time instant t ∈ tick as a parameter. This is to account for the time-dependent behaviour, similar to how we formalized the standard function MOVE in the beginning of this section. Furthermore, the above predicates that formalize the internal components, e.g., predicate HYSTERESIS_REQ_TAB, do not denote those translated from the ST implementation of IEC 61131-3. Instead, as one of our contributions, we provide high-level, input-output requirements that are not included in IEC 61131-3 (to be discussed in the next section). Such formal, compositional requirement are developed for the purpose of formalizing and verifying sophisticated, composite FBs.
Formalizing requirements of function blocks
As stated, IEC 61131-3 supplies low-level, implementation-oriented ST and/or FBD descriptions for function blocks. For the purpose of verifying the correctness of the supplied implementation, it is necessary to obtain requirements for FBs that are both complete and disjoint. Tabular expressions (in PVS) are an excellent notation for describing such requirements. Our method for deriving the tabular, input-output requirement for each FB is to partition its input domain into equivalence classes, and for each such input condition, we consider what the corresponding output from the FB should be.
As an example, we consider the requirement for function block LIMITS_ALARM. The expected input-output behaviour is depicted in the following Fig. 10 , and its tabular requirement (which constrains the relation between inputs X , H , L, EPS and outputs Q , QH, QL) is captured in the three accompanying tables. When variable value X exceeds the high limit H , the high flag QH becomes TRUE. Symmetrically, when X goes below the low limit L, the low flag QL becomes TRUE. Both flags QH and QL are set to FALSE when X is in the exclusive range of (L + EPS, H − EPS). There exists a hysteresis band for the high limit inside which the value of QH remains unchanged: [H − EPS, H]. Symmetrically, there exists a hysteresis band for the low limit: [L, L + EPS]. Finally, the alarm output Q is set to TRUE if and only if either of the flags is set to TRUE. Q is set to FALSE otherwise. The input-output requirement is captured in the three function tables. We use NC to denote "No Change", i.e., the value of variable QH is equal to the value at the previous time tick QH −1 . Alternatively we can use the previous value in the condition rows. As a result, we can explicitly write down the current value of this variable in the last result column instead of using NC (see an example in Fig. 21 ).
We will discuss in Section 5.2.3 as to how our formalization process revealed the need for two possible missing assumptions for the LIMITS_ALARM block from IEC 61131-3: We incorporate these assumptions into the formalizing theory of LIMITS_ALARM in PVS as follows. For assumption 1, we use the subtype posreal, i.e., the set of positive real numbers, to declare the type of the time-dependent input variable EPS (i.e., EPS: [tick → posreal]). For assumption 2, we define a higher-order dependent type dependent_high_limit_type for the type of high limit, which depends on values of the low limit L and the deadband size EPS. Then, we declare the high limit H accordingly (i.e., H : VAR dependent_high_limit_type).
We now present the PVS theory that formalizes the above intended requirement of the LIMITS_ALARM block. All input, output and internal variables are declared as time-dependent functions, taking the current time t as one of its parameters. ...
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END LIMITS_ALARM
To formalize the intended behaviour of each output, we define a separate function that has a tabular structure. Each of these functions is useful from two perspectives: 1) it is used to define the requirements predicate of the corresponding output variable (see below); and 2) it will be used to generate the witness of output value when conducting the consistency or feasibility proof (Section 4.1).
(H(L,EPS)(t),EPS(t)) ∧ X(t) <= H(L,EPS)(t) | prev || %-------------------------------------------------------------% | X(t) < sub(H(L,EPS)(t),EPS(t)) | FALSE || %-------------------------------------------------------------% ENDTABLE ENDIF MEASURE rank(t) f _QL(X,L,EPS)(t): RECURSIVE bool = IF init(t) THEN FALSE ELSE LET prev = F_QL(X,L,EPS)(pre(t)) IN TABLE %-----------------------------------------------% | X(t) < L(t) | TRUE || %-----------------------------------------------% | X(t) <= add(L(t),EPS(t)) ∧ X(t) >= L(t) | prev || %-----------------------------------------------% | X(t) > add(L(t),EPS(t)) | FALSE || %-----------------------------------------------% ENDTABLE ENDIF MEASURE rank(t) f _Q(QH,QL)(t): bool = TABLE | QH(t) OR QL(t) |TRUE || | NOT QH(t) ∧ NOT QL(t) | FALSE || ENDTABLE
Then, each output variable of the LIMITS_ALARM block is formalized as a predicate by reusing the above functions.
P_QH(X,H,L,EPS,QH): bool = FORALL (t:tick): QH(t) = f _QH(X,H,L,EPS)(t) P_QL(X,L,EPS,QL): bool = FORALL (t:tick): QL(t) = f _QL(X,L,EPS)(t) P_Q (QH,QL,Q): bool = FORALL (t:tick): Q (t) = f _Q(QH,QL)(t)
Finally, to derive the overall requirement of the LIMITS_ALARM block, the above three predicates (corresponding to the tables in Fig. 10 , p. 166) are composed using logical conjunctions (Section 3.2).
LIMITS_ALARM_REQ (H,X,L,EPS,QH,Q,QL): bool = P_QH(X,H,L,EPS,QH) ∧ P_QL(X,L,EPS,QL) ∧ P_Q (QH,QL,Q)
For any given input and output trajectories (mapping from ticks to values), the requirements predicate LIMITS_ALARM_REQ returns TRUE if they satisfy the above three output predicates; otherwise, it returns FALSE. This requirements predicate will later be used to verify the correctness of the FBD implementation of LIMITS_ALARM. This process can be generalized to verify other FBD implementations in IEC 61131-3.
Justification of our proposed requirements tables
Our proposed requirements tables for the LIMITS_ALARM block are by no means arbitrary and we justify them as follows.
Regarding the functionality of LIMITS_ALARM, the most authoritative source we could obtain is a one-line sentence from the standard [9, p. 190]: "This function block implements a high/low limit alarm with hysteresis on both outputs". Despite the fact that this requirement is written using an informal, natural language, a reasonably obvious approach to formalize it is by using the requirements of its component HYSTERESIS blocks. Based upon our analysis of the HYSTERESIS block (Section 5.2.2), we impose an assumption of non-negative deadband size. If we do not make this assumption, then the hysteresis FB implements a "toggle" of the output value when the input signal is outside of the deadband. See Section 5.2.2 for a detailed explanation. As far as the hysteresis FB is concerned, we believe that practitioners would not expect this toggling behaviour. If it is required, a different, appropriately named FB could be used to produce the toggling behaviour. Furthermore, we also believe that engineers would not expect that at a single system state, the low and high alarms are tripped simultaneously. As a result, we impose another assumption, namely that the two hysteresis regions do not overlap (Section 5.2.3).
Verifying function blocks in PVS
We consider the ST and FBD descriptions supplied by IEC 61131-3 as implementations of FBs. For each FB, under the same proof environment of PVS, we formalize (Section 3.1) its supplied implementation and capture (Section 3.2) its inputoutput requirement that is both complete and unambiguous. We now present the two kinds of verification we perform in PVS.
Verifying the correctness and consistency of an implementation
Given an implementation predicate I , our correctness theorem states that, if I holds for all possible inputs and outputs, then the corresponding requirement predicate R also holds. This corresponds to the proofs of correctness shown in Fig. 1 . For example, to prove that the FBD implementation of block LIMITS_ALARM in Section 3.1 is correct with respect to its requirement in Section 3.2, we must prove the following in PVS:
∀H, X, L, EPS • ∀QH, Q, QL • LIMITS_ALRM_IMPL(H, X, L, EPS, QH, Q, QL) ⇒ LIMITS_ALRM_REQ(H, X, L, EPS, QH, Q, QL)
(1)
The PVS specification of correctness checking is formulated as follows:
LIMITS_ALARM_CORRECTNESS: THEOREM LIMITS_ALARM_IMPL(H,X,L,EPS,QH,Q ,QL) ⇒ LIMITS_ALARM_REQ (H,X,L,EPS,QH,Q,QL)
Furthermore, we also need to ensure that the implementation is consistent or feasible, i.e., for each input list, there exists at least one corresponding list of outputs, such that I holds. Otherwise, the implementation trivially satisfies any requirements. This is shown in Fig. 1 as proofs of consistency. In the case of LIMITS_ALARM, we must prove the following in PVS:
∀H, X, L, EPS • ∃QH, Q , QL • LIMITS_ALRM_IMPL(H, X, L, EPS, QH, Q , QL) (2)
The PVS specification of consistency checking is formulated as follows:
LIMITS_ALARM_CONSISTENCY: THEOREM FORALL (H,X,L,EPS): EXISTS (QH,Q,QL): LIMITS_ALARM_IMPL(H,X,L,EPS,QH,Q ,QL)
Verifying the equivalence of implementations
In IEC 61131-3, the block LIMITS_ALARM is supplied with ST only. In theory, when both ST and FBD implementations are supplied for the same FB (e.g., STACK_INT), it may suffice to verify that each of the implementations is correct with respect to the requirement. However, as the behaviour of FBs is intended to be deterministic in most cases, it would be worth proving that the implementations (if they are given at the same level of abstraction) are equivalent, and generate scenarios, if any, where they are not. This is also labelled in Fig. 1 as proofs Consequently, to verify that the two supplied implementations are equivalent, we must prove the following in PVS:
In principle, we aim to prove that the ST and FBD implementations of the same FB, if applicable, agree on their external, input-output behaviour. However, the standard allows stateless standard functions (e.g., MOVE) to be converted into stateful function blocks, by adding a pair of input EN and output ENO [9, p. 68], which affects the execution flow of the function at runtime via interrupts. This means that if one implementation uses the stateless version, while the other uses the stateful version, then their runtime implementations may not be provably equivalent (because the implementation that uses the stateful version is possible to be interrupted, which is not possible for the other). Consequently, in this case we are only able to prove that the behaviour of the implementation without interrupts conforms to (i.e., is a subset of) that of the implementation with possible interrupts, by replacing "≡" with "⇒" in Equation (3).
As an example, consider the STACK_INT block. The ST and FBD implementations are supplied at different levels of abstraction: the FBD description is closer to the hardware level as it uses additional execution control variables (i.e., a pair of enable in/out variables, EN/ENO) to indicate system errors (Appendix E of IEC 61131-3). Consequently, as explained above, we only need to prove that the lower level FBD implementation conforms to the higher level ST implementation.
Although IEC 61131-3 (2003) had been in use for almost 10 years, while performing this verification on STACK_INT, we found that we could not prove the implication (4) without introducing an explicit negation FB, see Section 5.3.1. We believe this is a good example of how the precision of formality can help us find errors that manual inspection often overlooks. In all likelihood a practical implementation of this FB in a real project would eventually fail and the error would be found. However, finding errors early is something we all strive for.
Case study: standard IEC 61131-3 including Annex F (version 2.0, 2003)
To justify the value of our approach (Sections 3 and 4), we have formalized and verified all of the FBs from IEC 61131-3, as well as standard functions that are used in these function blocks. Our work so far has revealed a number of possible issues. For the purpose of this paper, we will discuss the issues we found, and our suggestions on how to deal with them. We place issues we found into three categories: ambiguous behaviour (Section 5.1), possible missing input assumptions (Section 5.2), and inconsistent implementations (Section 5.3).
Before discussing each found issue in detail, it is critical for us to remind the reader that: 1) we derive our own inputoutput requirements table for each function block based on the description in the standard and our experience; and 2) we determine correctness based on these proposed requirements tables.
As is often the case, the mathematically precise requirements are not so much of interest in themselves, but rather that they facilitate very specific discussion on those requirements. Readers may disagree with our version of the required behaviour, but they are very clear as to what we say that required behaviour is. An inviolate assumption in our methodology is that we start with mathematically precise requirements.
Ambiguous behaviour
Pulse timer in timing diagrams
The block PULSE is a timer defined in IEC 61131-3, whose graphical declaration is shown on the LHS of Fig. 11 . It takes two inputs (a Boolean condition IN and a time duration, PT) and produces two outputs (a Boolean value Q and a time duration, ET). It acts as a pulse generator: as soon as the input condition IN is detected to hold, it generates a pulse to let output Q remain TRUE for a constant time duration, PT. The elapsed time that Q has remained TRUE can also be monitored via output ET. IEC 61131-3 presents a timing diagram as depicted on the RHS of Fig. 11 , in which the horizontal time axis is labelled with time instants t i (i ∈ 0..5), to specify (an incomplete set of) the behaviour of block PULSE.
The above timing diagram suggests that when a rising edge of the input condition IN is detected at time t, another rising edge that occurs before time t + P T may not be detected, e.g., the rising edge occurring at t 3 might be missed as
The use of timing diagrams to specify behaviour is limited to a small number of use cases, and subtle or critical boundary cases are likely to be missing. We formalize the PULSE timer using tabular expressions that ensure both completeness and disjointness.
Most of the critical behaviours have been captured by the timing diagrams. However, while developing the tabular expressions we found that there are at least two scenarios that are not covered by the above timing diagram.
1. If a rising edge of condition IN occurred at t 2 + PT, should there be a pulse generated to let output Q remain TRUE for another PT time units? If so, there would be two connected pulses: from t 2 to t 2 + P T and from t 2 + PT to t 2 + 2PT. 2. If the rising edge that occurred at t 3 stays high until some time t k (t 2 + PT ≤ t k ≤ t 4 ), should the output ET be defaulted to 0 at time t 2 + PT or at time t k ?
We use the three tables in Fig. 12 to formalize the behaviour of the PULSE timer, where outputs Q and ET and the internal variable pulse_start_time are initialized to, respectively, FALSE, 0, and 0. The behaviour in these tables now answers the questions left open by the specific version of the timing diagram shown in Fig. 12 ("No", and "t 2 + PT"). Even if the questions are not obvious, if a developer suddenly wonders about these specific behaviour, the tabular expressions provide explicit answers, while the timing diagram cannot. The tables have their obvious equivalents in PVS. To make the timing behaviour precise, we define two auxiliary predicates Held_For and Held_For_ts which are based on the work presented in [18] : became FALSE between t2 and t3), so the value of ET is defaulted back to 0. As the PULSE timer is not supplied with an implementation, there are no correctness and consistency proofs to be conducted. Nonetheless, obtaining a precise, complete, and disjoint requirement is valuable for future concrete implementations.
Implicit delay unit
PLC applications often use feedback loops: outputs of an FB are connected as inputs of either another FB, or the FB itself. IEC 61131-3 specifies feedback loops through either a connecting line or shared names of inputs and outputs. However, feedback values (or intermediate output values) cannot be computed instantaneously in reality.
The behaviour of the SR block [9, p. 77] may be derived from the following extracts from the standard:
• The above first item describes the mechanism that is adopted by the SR block. Combining the latter two items implies that there is an implicit delay between the feedback variable value being produced and the time at which it is used as an input. Note, however, for the formal verification for FBs that contain feedback loops, we need to make the unit delay explicit. Therefore, in our modelling framework of time, we introduce a unit delay block z −1 to formalize the above extracts from the standard, and to explicitly inform users that there will be a delay of one unit of time before the newly-evaluated feedback variable value can be used as an input. A unit delay block z −1 with its formalization is shown in Fig. 13 : There is an explicit, one-tick delay between the input and output of block z −1 , making it suitable for denoting feedback values as output values produced in the previous execution cycle. The type of i and o can be any defined type, e.g., Boolean type in the example of block SR, but have to be the same type.
To illustrate the use of block z −1 , we consider the block SR that creates a set-dominant latch (a.k.a., flip-flop) in Fig. 14 . The block SR takes as inputs a Boolean set flag S 1 and a Boolean reset flag R, and returns a Boolean output Q 1 . The value of Q 1 is fed back as another input of block SR itself. Value of Q 1 remains TRUE as long as the set flag S 1 is enabled. Q 1 is reset to FALSE not only when the reset flag is enabled, but also when the set flag is disabled (so it cannot dominate the output result). Otherwise, Q 1 stays unchanged. There should be a delay between the value of Q 1 which is computed and passed to the next execution cycle. We formalize this by adding the explicit unit delay block z −1 and conjoining predicates for the internal blocks (as shown in Fig. 14) . Blocks B 1 (formalized by predicate NEG), B 2 (CONJ), B 3 (DISJ), and B 4 (z −1 ) in Fig. 14 denote the FB of, respectively, logical negation, conjunction, disjunction, and delay. Arrows w 1 , w 2 , and w 3 are internal connectives that are used to connect those internal blocks.
Adding an explicit unit delay block z −1 to formalize feedback loops led us to discharge the correctness and consistency theorems (Section 4) of the FBD implementation in Fig. 14. More precisely, the following theorems, as formulated in (5) and (6) , are discharged in PVS, in which SR_FBD_IMPL, SR_REQ denote the FBD implementation and the tabular requirement of block SR. (6) Our tabular expression for the requirement of the SR block is shown in Fig. 15 : Fig. 15 . Requirement of the SR block using a tabular expression.
Possible missing input assumptions
In this section we discuss how we uncover issues from the standard that are related to missing input assumptions. First of all, we make a clear distinction between our intended use of TCCs and lemmas. On the one hand, we use TCCs to ensure that the requirements tables are "healthy" (i.e., complete, disjoint, and well-defined) and can thus be reused as components of other function block theories. For example, to formulate the requirements of the LIMITS_ALARM block (Section 3.2), we represent the two instances of the HYSTERESIS block by referencing its requirements table, with the obligation to prove that it is both complete and disjoint. As another example, consider the AVERAGE block in Section 5.2.5: to formulate any composite function block that uses AVERAGE as a component, we are obliged to prove that its requirements table is well-defined (i.e., the denominator N is not equal to zero).
On the other hand, for any function block, we may use lemmas to express certain desired properties that are not directly expressed in its requirements table. We consider these lemmas as additional requirements that implementation(s) of the function block in question must also satisfy. For example, consider the DELAY block in Section 5.2.4: we use the IXIN_IXOUT_REL to assert that the output index IXOUT is always N samples behind the input index IXIN. The formulation of lemma IXIN_IXOUT_REL is not arbitrary: it is based on the (informal) requirements that the standards provides for the DELAY block [9, p. 187]: "This function block implements an N-sample delay". As a result, any unproven TCCs or lemmas suggest that it is not safe to reuse the function block in question, as there are issues (e.g., missing an explicit input assumption) with either its requirements table or its implementation(s).
Impact of unproven TCCs or lemmas.
In our verification framework, each unproven lemma or table with unproven TCCs is not depended upon by theories of other functions. In particular, we do not reuse any unproven lemmas to prove properties of other function blocks. We achieve this by creating a "fixed" version of the FB implementation or requirements table, incorporated with our proposed solution, e.g., an explicit input assumption. In the case of an unproven lemma, we create a new lemma that is identical to the unproven one, except that it references the "fixed" version of FB implementation or requirements table, and it is thus provable. That is, for each "fixed" version of a function block, all the associated TCCs, lemmas, and theorems are proved.
For example, we have two versions of specifications for the HYSTERESIS block (Section 5.2.2): one with the non-negativehysteresis-band-size assumption, and the other one without. The unprovable TCC only affects the correctness of the version of HYSTERESIS without such an assumption, and we do not reference this version of HYSTERESIS elsewhere. On the other hand, the version of HYSTERESIS with an explicitly introduced assumption can be proved correct, and we thus can safely reference it in the context of the LIMITS_ALARM block.
As we carefully guided the PVS prover when conducting proofs, for all TCCs and lemmas that we failed to prove, we could: 1) trace back to the original FBs in the standard; 2) decide whether our requirements are incorrect or the supplied implementation is not consistent with the requirements; and 3) uncover issues that we report in this paper. As indicated above, all lemmas and TCCs of the fixed versions of FB theories are proved, and the proofs of all the final results do not make use of any unproven lemmas or TCCs. Furthermore, all proofs are available for inspection of correctness.
Compositionality. The introduction of input assumptions does not break the compositionality of our approach. When an FB in question cannot be proved as satisfying its input-output requirements, we attempt to trace back to its specification and identify the source of failure. For circumstances that lead to undesirable results (e.g., the toggling behaviour of a HYSTERESIS block in Section 5.2.2), we propose to precisely character them as input assumptions (e.g., positive hysteresis deadband size). An alternative solution is that of defensive programming: users may modify the FB implementation from the standard, such that it always checks for conditions that will lead to abnormal behaviour, then take the appropriate actions (e.g., flag an error, reset the state, do nothing, etc.).
Input assumptions are useful in that they make those problematic scenarios explicit to users of the FBs, without the need for them to discover them from the source code. In PVS, we formalize input assumptions using predicate subtypes (e.g., posreal for the hysteresis deadband size in Section 5.2.2) or dependent types (non-overlapping hysteresis regions for the limits alarm in Section 3.2).
Consequently, TCCs that are specific to these input assumptions will be automatically generated by PVS. That is, adding input restrictions means that there are additional proof obligations to be discharged to make sure that the relevant FBs are invoked with legitimate input values. However, this does not break the compositionality in our approach. For a composite FB, if any of its component FBs is supplied with input values that are not provably legitimate, then the correctness of that composite block cannot be proved, which is a desired outcome.
Limit on the counter blocks
IEC 61131-3 describes three types of counters. An up-down counter (CTUD) in IEC 61131-3 is composed of an up counter (CTU) and a down counter (CTD). The ST implementation and graphical declaration are provided in the standard as shown in Fig. 16 .
The output counter value CV is incremented (using the up counter) if a rising edge is detected on an input condition CU, or CV is decremented (using the down counter) if a rising edge is detected on the input CD. Actions of increment and decrement are subject to, respectively, a high limit PVmax and a low limit PVmin. The value of CV is loaded to a preset value PV if a load flag LD is TRUE; and it is defaulted to 0 if a reset condition R is enabled. Two Boolean outputs are produced to reflect the change on CV: QU ≡ (CV > PV) and QD ≡ (CV <= 0). Note that the lines connected to CU and CD inputs are right-arrowed. In the IEC 61131-3, it denotes the signals from a rising edge detector function block. Similarly, left-arrowed lines denote the signals from a falling edge detector function block. We have formalized and verified these two blocks in PVS.
As we attempted to formalize and verify the correctness of the ST implementation of block CTUD supplied by IEC 61131-3, we found two missing assumptions:
1. The relationship between the high and low limits is not stated. Let PVmin be 10 and PVmax be 1, then the counter can only increment when CV < 1, decrement when CV > 10 (disabled when 1 ≤ CV ≤ 10). This contradicts with our intuition about how low and high limits are used to constrain the behaviour of a counter. Consequently, we introduce a new assumption 11 : PVmin < PVmax.
2. The range of the preset value PV, with respect to the limits PVmin and PVmax, is not clear. If CV is loaded by the value of PV, such that PV > PVmax, the output QU can never be TRUE, as the counter increments when CV < PVmax. Similarly, if PV is such that PV < PVmin and PV = 1, the output QD can never be TRUE, as the counter decrements when CV > PVmin. As a result, we introduce another assumption: PVmin < PV < PVmax.
Our tabular requirement for the up-down counter that incorporates the missing assumption is shown in Fig. 17 . Similarly, we added PV < PVmax and PVmin < PV as assumptions for, respectively, the up and down counters.
We now need to discuss how we arrived at our assumptions. We also need to consider the impact of adopting the ST code as is.
Unlike in the case of the LIMITS_ALARM block, in the standard there is no summary of what the intended functionality of the up-down counter (CUTD) is. Instead, the standard suggests [9, p. 78] that the ST implementation in its entirety represents the requirements of CUTD: "The operation of these function blocks [e.g., CUTD] shall be as specified in the corresponding function block bodies [i.e., ST code]". Consequently, the only authoritative source we can rely on for the purpose of analysis is the ST code itself (RHS in Fig. 16 ).
Result Condition
Inspecting the variable declaration and implementation body of the ST code, we make the following observations:
1. Since outputs QU and QD are declared as variables, as opposed to constants, their values are expected to vary according to changes of the state (i.e., CV and PV). More precisely, the last two lines of the implementation body indicate that
2. The choice of variable names PVmax and PVmin suggest that they are, respectively, the upper bound and lower bound for the value of PV.
3.
The if-then-else statement, executed when ¬R ∧ ¬LD, suggests that the value of PVmax is used as an upper bound to prevents increments on the counter value CV from overflow, and similarly for PVmin to prevent decrements on CV from underflow. More precisely, the condition PVmin ≤ CV ≤ PVmax is an intended invariant, and the counter block is effectively disabled (i.e., value of CV remains unchanged) when this invariant is violated.
Our observations above are arguably consistent with ones made by any experienced engineer or programmer. Therefore, any violation of them may suggest a possible issue.
Our first proposed assumption PVmin < PVmax is intended to guard the truth of observation 2 above. Our common perception should allow us to assume that for the same monitored quantity (e.g., PV), its upper bound is strictly larger than its lower bound, for otherwise it is nearly impossible for the monitored quantity to fall "within the boundaries" (i.e.,
Even if one may argue that for this particular example, the value PV is meant to be chosen from either the interval [PVmin, PVmax] or the interval [PVmax, PVmin], depending on how PVmin and PVmax are related at runtime. However, this is even more problematic because according to observation 3 above, when
PVmax < PVmin, choosing a value of PV from interval [PVmax, PVmin] will effectively disable the counter block. Our second proposed assumption PVmin < PV < PVmax is justified by observation 1 above that PV should be chosen within its defined boundaries. Without such assumption, say PV is always chosen such that PV > PVmax, then our observations that QU ≡ (CV > PV), and that CV ≤ PVmax, imply that QU declared as a variable will act like a constant FALSE. A similar argument applies to the case of PV < PVmin.
Therefore, we think it is more justifiable to impose the two assumptions than not to do so. Nonetheless, the existing ST code in the standard does not prevent users of the CUTD block from violating these assumptions, in which case the counter block may, as explained above, become completely disabled and/or always output QU and QD as FALSE.
Again, this amply demonstrates the value of our approach: it makes these two input details (subtle yet non-negligible as they greatly impact the resulting behaviour) precise and explicit for users to decide. If the ST code is used as is, users may inadvertently disable the counter simply by inputting values that violate our suggested invariant. No error would be generated. We believe that this kind of control over functionality should always be explicit.
Deadband size of the HYSTERESIS block
The HYSTERESIS block implements a Boolean hysteresis: the output value depends not only on the current input values, but also the output value in the past. Its declaration (shown on the LHS in Fig. 18 ) requires three real-valued input numbers: XIN1 is typically read from a sensor, XIN2 specifies its set point, and EPS indicates that the deadband (above and below the set point) within which the Boolean output signal value Q should remain unchanged.
We formalize the requirement of the HYSTERESIS block in Fig. 19 , with the assumption that the deadband size is nonnegative. The shaded area in Fig. 19 denotes the hysteresis deadband (with a size of 2 × EPS). If the current sensor value XIN1 is such that XIN1 < XIN2 − EPS, then output Q becomes FALSE. Similarly, if it is the case that XIN1 > XIN2 + EPS, then Q becomes TRUE. For the stability of Q's value, if the sensor value lies within the deadband (i.e., XIN2 − EPS ≤ XIN1 ≤ XIN2 + EPS), then output Q remains unchanged (a case of no change). For the behaviour specified in Fig. 19 , it is necessary to have the assumption about the value of EPS being non-negative.
Otherwise, the two intervals XIN1 > (XIN2 + EPS) and XIN1 < (XIN2 − EPS) may overlap (i.e., the two constraints are not disjoint) when EPS < 0, and an unprovable proof obligation (TCC of Disjointness) is generated in PVS (which we omit here). Nonetheless, in practice, subject to the oscillation on the sensor value XIN1, the value of input EPS should be positive (and sufficiently large) to create a deadband for stabilizing the value of output Q. Therefore, in our PVS models, when proving the correctness of HYSTERESIS and blocks that use it (e.g., the LIMITS_ALARM block discussed in Section 5.2.3), we adopt a stronger assumption EPS > 0 than that for Fig. 19 .
Result Condition
We will relax such an assumption of positive deadband size later in this section (in Fig. 21) , by considering the behaviour of the HYSTERESIS with a negative deadband size.
For the purpose of verification, we translate the ST implementation (on the RHS in Fig. 18 ) into a PVS predicate that has a tabular structure 12 in Fig. 20 . In this complete and disjoint tabular representation of the ST code, there is no assumption about the value of input EPS (i.e., whether or not it is non-negative). However, the behaviour of the ST implementation (Fig. 20) does not conform to that in Fig. 19 . The implementation supplied by the standard actually allows a toggling behaviour on the value of output Q. In the case of a negative value for EPS, the value of output Q alternates between FALSE and TRUE (or 0 and 1) when XIN2 is within the headband. Let's consider a concrete example. Say EPS = −2, XIN1 = 1, and XIN2 = 2, then by executing the ST code (RHS in Fig. 18 and Fig. 20 ) multiple times, we obtain alternating (or toggling) results (of 0 and 1) for Q.
To understand this toggling behaviour more clearly, we provide an extended tabular requirement that incorporates the case of negative EPS (Fig. 21) , where the two rows that represent the toggling behaviour are set in boldface.
It may be that developers actually use the toggling feature provided by the functionality in the standard. However, this feature is definitely not what most practitioners would expect from a hysteresis FB. As we said earlier, if we intend to include such behaviour, the behaviour must be explicitly clear. In this particular case, we strongly believe that the toggling behaviour should be implemented in a different FB, not hidden within a hysteresis FB that changes its behaviour depending on whether or not the hysteresis value is positive or negative. The value of our approach is that it made this hidden behaviour explicit, so that we can make decisions on whether or not to include it. Fig. 21 . Requirement of the block HYSTERESIS: with no assumption on EPS.
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High/low limits of LIMITS_ALARM block
The function block LIMITS_ALARM (with two internal blocks HIGH_ALARM and LOW_ALARM) has been used as a running example in this paper: its declaration in Section 2.1, its FBD implementation formalized in PVS in Section 3.1.5, its tabular requirement in Section 3.2, and its verification conditions in Section 4. In this section we discuss the two missing assumptions of this block. 2. We impose another assumption H − EPS > L + EPS, or equivalently H − L > 2EPS, to separate two hysteresis zones. We reckon that the intention of having both high and low limits is to have two disjoint hysteresis zones. Otherwise, if the two zones overlap, then the high and low alarms may be tripped simultaneously, which would falsify the system property that at any time only the high limit or low limit can be tripped.
During the proof of overall correctness, we introduce three lemmas, each corresponding to the correctness of an output variable. This exemplifies the decomposition of the proof for the goal theorem into smaller ones.
Having introduced the dependent type of dependent_high_limit_type (Section 3.2), we are able to prove the invariant property, that high alarm and low alarm can not be tripped at the same time, as a theorem PROPERTY0:
With our tabular requirement that incorporates the above two assumptions, we proved that the ST implementation supplied by IEC 61131-3 is both correct and consistent (Section 4). The proof process involved predicates for the 5 predefined functions and FBs, 3 lemmas for implementation correctness, 1 theorem for implementation feasibility, 1 theorem for implementation correctness, and about 140 PVS proof commands.
Initialization failure of the DELAY block
The DELAY block (declared on the LHS of Fig. 22 ) generates an N-sample delay between the input XIN and the output XOUT. That is, the value of XOUT corresponds to the value of the last Nth XIN. The delay may be disabled, i.e., XOUT = XIN, by setting a Boolean input flag RUN to FALSE. More precisely, we formulate the requirement of the DELAY block using the tabular expressions in Fig. 23 . The upper table in Fig. 23 specifies last_disabled the latest moment in time when the input flag RUN is set to FALSE. The lower table in Fig. 23 documents the relation between the inputs (i.e., N, XIN, and RUN) and the output (i.e., XOUT). When the delay is disabled (i.e., RUN is FALSE), the value of XOUT is set to that of XIN (i.e., no delay is occurring). Otherwise, when the delay is enabled, we differentiate between two cases: whether or not RUN is set to TRUE for a time period of at least N ticks. First, if the delay has been enabled for sufficiently long, the value of XOUT is set to that of XIN N ticks behind. Second, before the value of delayed XIN is ready, the value of XOUT is set to that of XIN at time (i.e., last_disabled) when the DELAY block was last disabled.
The ST implementation of the DELAY block (shown on the RHS of Fig. 22 ) uses a circular array X to maintain a sliding window of size N, as new values of the sample XIN are read. Then, the output XOUT corresponds to the cell in array X that is N-position behind the current sample XIN. Two auxiliary variables, IXIN and IXOUT, are used to store indices of cells that store, respectively, XIN and XOUT. When the input flag RUN is set to TRUE, indicating that the N-sample delay should be in effect, values of both IXIN and IXOUT are incremented accordingly to slide the window. 13 Otherwise, values of IXIN, IXOUT,
and their in-between cells are reset.
Inspecting its ST implementation, the intended usage of the DELAY block requires RUN being disabled in order to properly set the two indices. As an example, consider the following use case: 1) disable RUN initially (t = 0) to properly separate the two indices apart; and 2) enable RUN from then on (t > 0). For phase 2), there are two cases to consider. Before N samples have been collected, the output value should equal to that of the input when RUN was last disabled. After N samples have been buffered, the proper delay effect should be observed: output value equals to that of the last Nth input. However, we discovered that the supplied ST implementation does not prevent users from enabling RUN initially, in which case the delay effect will never occur, even after N samples have been collected. More precisely, we were unable to prove the following property, which justifies itself by formalizing the informal requirements of the DELAY block [9, p. 187]: "This function block implements an N-sample delay", meaning that the value of output should equal that of the input N-samples ago.
IXIN_IXOUT_REL:
Recursive functions f _IXOUT and f _IXIN return the current value of, respectively, IXOUT and IXIN. Lemma IXIN_IXOUT_REL states that, in the context of a circular array of size 128, IXOUT is N always samples behind IXIN. The proof is based upon an induction on time t using the induction scheme time_induction (see Section 2.4). By reformatting the generated unprovable PVS sequent, we obtained an unprovable predicate: init(t) ⇒ mod(0 + N, 128) = 0. That is, the initial distance between cells referenced by IXIN and IXOUT should be N, but the initialization in the original implementation in the standard failed to satisfy this constraint.
From the ST implementation in Fig. 22 , both IXIN and IXOUT are initialized to 0. This means that initially they point to same the cell in array X . As the DELAY block remains enabled (i.e., input RUN set to TRUE), both IXIN and IXOUT are incremented and will thus always point to the same cell. Consequently, there is no effect of an N-sample delay.
We propose to solve this issue by initializing IXIN to N instead of 0, such that cells referenced by IXIN and IXOUT are N samples apart. As a result, we are able to prove that the revised implementation satisfies the lemma IXIN_IXOUT_REL.
Moreover, the value of N may be set to 0, which means there should be 0-sample delay in effect. In this case, both IXIN and IXOUT will, consistently, always point to the same cell in array X . However, allowing such a boundary value for N can have dangerous consequence, e.g., the client block PID (Section 5.2.6) uses the DELAY block as one of its components.
As a result, we consider the input of N = 0 to be an unacceptable case and redefine the type of N by excluding value 0: {1, 2, . . . , 128}.
Finally, based on the above reasoning, we formalize the complete tabular requirement for the DELAY block (Fig. 23) . Once we have added the lemma IXIN_IXOUT_REL to enforce an invariant not included in the original ST, we clearly have to ask ourselves whether the addition of the lemma is justified. Similar to the case of the LIMITS_ALARM block, the most authoritative source regarding the functionality of DELAY we could obtain from the standard is a one-line sentence [9, p. 187] which says that the value of the output should equal that of the input N-samples ago. As the lemma IXIN_IXOUT_REL only makes this informal statement formal, we believe our use of it to verify the correctness of the ST code is justified. Furthermore, when the lemma IXIN_IXOUT_REL failed to prove, we were able to trace back to the original ST code, and confirm that the ST code did not always match the informal statement of its behaviour. More precisely, we found the use case where RUN is always enabled, keeping the output and input indices always synchronized on their values, and thus causing the desired delay to never occur. As an example, consider that input N is set to 5 for the DELAY block, meaning that there should be a 5-sample delay occurring (after the first 5 samples have been buffered). However, the ST code does not prevent the user from enabling RUN right from the beginning, and the consequence is that the delay effect will never be observed, even after 5 samples have been collected. We consider this to be non-compliance with its informal requirements [9, p. 187].
Result Condition
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Division by zero of the AVERAGE block
The AVERAGE block (whose declaration is shown on the LHS in Fig. 24 ) computes a running average XOUT over the last N values of the input sample XIN. The ST implementation of AVERAGE (shown on the RHS in Fig. 24) indicates that it is a composite FB. It references an instance of the DELAY block (Section 5.2.4), storing the latest N values of the input XIN, to maintain an internal sliding window of size N. An internal variable SUM is used to store the running average, updated by subtracting the oldest value (i.e., output value from the DELAY instance) and adding the current value of XIN. Furthermore, the output XOUT may be calculated differently depending upon the value of a Boolean input flag RUN. If RUN is TRUE, then the value of XOUT represents the running average SUM/N as expected. Otherwise, it is reset to the current value of the input XIN.
Based on our understanding of the ST implementation, we formulate the requirement of the AVERAGE block in Fig. 25 . Similar to the case of the DELAY block (Section 5.2.4), the value of XOUT is specified using last_disabled (i.e., the time when RUN was last set to FALSE) and the Held_For (Section 5.1.1) timing operator. There are four cases to consider: . The obvious constraint is that is that the total number of samples from 1) and 2) equals N.
As an example, consider the following scenario, where currently t = 6 and RUN has become and remained TRUE since when t = 4:
In the above scenario, the resulting average XOUT should be The above proof obligation is generated when the implementation predicate is type-checked. It states that when input RUN is TRUE and the current tick is not the initial tick, the value of N can not be zero. However, this sequent is unprovable. We propose to solve this issue by constraining the type of N such that the value of zero is excluded: {1, 2, . . . , 128}.
Are there other options for solving the issue of possible division by zero? The ST code could be modified so that it defensively handles this issue by checking for the value of N being zero, and either flagging an error or returning some default result. However, we think it is better to explicitly state this input assumption and thus warn the intended users of the AVERAGE block that they need to cope with this possibility.
Division by zero of the PID block
The PID (proportional-integral-derivative) block, whose declaration is shown on the LHS in Fig. 26 , implements the classical three-term controller for closed-loop feedback control. The output signal from the PID, based upon its internal three-term computation, is used in many industrial applications where stable control is required using the feedback of the input process value.
At each current time instant t, the PID controller computes an "error" value as the difference between values of a measured process (PV) variable and a desired set point (SP). The controller then outputs a control signal (XOUT) as the result of a weighted sum of three terms: 1) the proportional term (depending on the current error); 2) the integral term (depending on errors accumulated from past); and 3) the derivative term (predicting error in the future). The computation also depends on other inputs constants: KP (proportionality constant), TR (reset time), TD (derivative time), and CYCLE (sampling period). At the top level, we formalize the requirements of the PID block as a one-line equation, resembling the last statement of its ST implementation (shown on the RHS in Fig. 26 15 where ITERM and DTERM are instances of, respectively, the INTEGRAL (Fig. 27 and Fig. 28 ) block and the DERIVATIVE (Fig. 29 and Fig. 30 ) block. Indeed, formalizing the requirements of these two functional units is also our contribution. As components of the composite PID block, these two FBs are used to compute, respectively, the integral and derivative terms. We write ITERM.XOUT and DETERM.XOUT to denote output values resulting from their last invocations.
Result Condition
The INTEGRAL block ( Fig. 27 and Fig. 28 ) implements the integral of values of input XIN over time. The strategy of implementation is an approximation using partitions with right endpoints (with an input sampling period CYCLE). The integral result XOUT is reset to a preset value X0 if the Boolean input flag R1 is enabled. The integral is calculated if another input flag RUN is also enabled; otherwise, no new partitions are added (i.e., XOUT remains unchanged). Another output Q is set to TRUE while the integral is not reset; otherwise, Q is set to FALSE.
The DERIVATIVE block ( Fig. 29 and Fig. 30 ) computes the differentiation of values of input XIN with respect to time. The rate of change is computed on the basis of: 1) an input sampling period CYCLE; and 2) values of input XIN at present and at the previous three clock ticks (i.e., XIN and XIN −i , i ∈ {1, 2, 3}). The derivative result XOUT is reset to 0.0 if a Boolean flag RUN is disabled.
As indicated from the ST implementation of PID (Fig. 26 ) and tabular requirements of INTEGRAL and DERIVATIVE (Fig. 27  to 30 ), an input Boolean flag AUTO is set to distinguish cases in the computation. If AUTO is set TRUE, the controller attempts to output XOUT closer to the desired set point value. Otherwise, another input X0, typically suppled by a transfer station, is used for a manual output adjustment.
However, observing the ST implementation of the PID block, the integral term is calculated through a division (of the output value XOUT from the FB instance ITERM) by the reset time TR. The type of TR, the set of real numbers, includes the possibility of zero that will lead to an undefined integral term. Similar to the case of the AVERAGE block (Section 5.2.5), this issue is reflected by an unprovable proof sequent generated by PVS, requiring that the value of TR can not be zero. As a result, our proposed solution is to redefine the data type for TR to exclude the value of zero. This serves the same purpose as an assumption that TR not be equal to zero.
Inconsistent length setting of the DIFFEQ block
The DIFFEQ block (whose declaration is shown on the LHS in Fig. 31  16 ) 
Issue 2: Missing FB in the FBD implementation. However, we failed to prove Equation (7) and the following unprovable proof sequent was generated in PVS.
17
STACK_INT_fbd_implies_st_original.3.2.2.1 :
As introduced in Section 2.3, this proof sequent can be discharged by proving that the conjunction of antecedents implies the disjunction of consequents. Variables in the sequent above are skolem constants (i.e., arbitrary constants of the corresponding types) that are used to eliminate quantifiers. The COND construct is a multi-way extension to the polymorphic IF-THEN-ELSE construct in PVS. t, PTR, INP, and PUSH are all arbitrary (yet type-correct) constants. At the tth tick (Section 2.3) of time, an input request PUSH is made to push an integer INP onto a stack STK, and the push operation moves the internal stack pointer to a new position PTR.
In the above sequent, the antecedent is inferred from the behaviour of the FBD implementation (Fig. 35) , and the consequence from that of the ST implementation (LHS in Fig. 34) . Inspecting the sequent, we identified a missing negation from the antecedent. From the consequence, we observe that the push operation is performed and the pointer is updated accordingly (i.e., STK(PTR(t)) = INP(t)) when the stack would not overflow (i.e., ¬OFLO(t)). On the other hand, from the antecedent, the same push operation is not associated with the wrong guard (i.e., OFLO(t)), meaning that the push operation is performed when the stack is already full.
Similarly, by inspecting the FBD and ST code, we found that there is a missing negation block NOT between the EQUATION and the lower MOVE block (Fig. 35) . That is, output OFLO from the EQUATION block (i.e., whether or not there is a stack overflow) should be negated so that it can be passed as the enabling condition of the lower MOVE block.
With the revised FBD implementation for PUSH_STK (illustrated in Fig. 36 with highlighted modifications), we are able to prove Equation (7). We also proved that both the ST and FBD implementations are consistent (Section 4.1). For the correctness theorem, as the logical implication is transitive, we only need to prove that the more abstract ST implementation conforms to the requirement: 
Finally, we provide the complete requirement of the STACK_INT block in tabular expressions in the Appendix B. A table is created for each output variable: EMPTY (Fig. 42) , OFLO (Fig. 43) , and OUT (Fig. 44) . In fact, we found that the state of internal variables is necessary for us to define the behaviour of the stack: NI (Fig. 39) , PTR (Fig. 40) , and STK(PTR) (Fig. 41) . 17 For clarity, we omit the irrelevant lines in this proof sequent.
We had a dilemma here regarding these inconsistent implementations. The obvious alternative is to fix the ST implementation for STACK_INT, making it agree with the behaviour of the FBD implementation. However, we would then have two implementations that consistently exhibit dangerous behaviour (e.g., pushing an item onto the stack only when it is already overflowed). Therefore, we think our proposed solution of fixing the problematic behaviour of the FBD implementation is more reasonable than the alternative.
Related work
There are many articles on formalizing and verifying PLC programs specified by programming languages covered in IEC 61131-3, such as sequential function charts (SFCs). Some approaches do this using model checking: e.g., to formalize a subset of the language of instruction lists (ILs) using timed automata, and to verify real-time properties in Uppaal [25] ; to automatically transform SFC programs into the synchronous data flow language of Lustre, amenable to mechanized support for checking properties [26] ; to translate ST and FBD into a synchronized data-flow language SIGNAL to compile and analyze the verification of specifications [27] ; to transform FBD specifications to Uppaal formal models to verify safety applications in the industrial automation domain [28] ; to provide the formal operational semantics of ILs which is encoded into the symbolic model checker Cadence SMV, and to verify rich behavioural properties written in linear temporal logic (LTL) [29] ; and to provide the formal verification of a safety procedure in a nuclear power plant (NPP) in which a verified Coloured Petri Net (CPN) model is derived by reinterpretation from the FBD description [30] ; to translate the algorithms of ladder diagrams (LDs) and timed FBs into finite state automata in which some properties are verified in SMV [31] ; There is also an integration of SMV and Uppaal to handle, respectively, untimed and timed SFC programs [32] .
Some other approaches adopt the verification environment of a theorem prover: e.g., to check the correctness of SFC programs, automatically generated from a graphical front-end, in Coq [33] ; and to formalize PLC programs using higher-order logic and to discharge safety properties in HOL [34] . These works are similar to ours in that PLC programs are formalized and supported for mechanized verifications of implementations. An algebra approach for PLC programs verification is presented in [35] . In [36] , a trace function method (TFM) based approach is presented to solve the same problem as ours.
Our work is inspired by [37] in that the overall system behaviour is defined by taking the conjunction of those of internal components (circuits in [37] or FBs in our case). Our proposed solutions to the timing issues of the PULSE timer are consistent with [38] . However, our approach is novel in that 1) we also obtain tabular requirements to be checked against, instead of writing properties directly for the chosen theorem prover or model checker; and 2) our formalization makes it easier to comprehend and to reason about properties of disjointness and completeness.
The related work is motivated by the lack of formal semantics for the programming notations defined in the standard, and attempts to remove ambiguities. However, the issues we found are not reported in the related work. We situate our work from three aspects: 1) extent of case study; 2) value of results; and 3) practical implication.
Extent of case study. Our approach is able to handle all ST and FBD programs that are listed in [9] , including its Annex F, whereas other work (e.g., [25, 27, 29, 31] ) focuses on limited language constructs or example FBs.
Value of results. To our knowledge, there is only a limited number of papers that illustrate the proposed verification approach via a case study, but none of them conduct a case study to the same extent as ours, let alone categorize the uncovered issues. In this paper, our results are based on the formalization and proofs of all FBs listed in the standard and its Annex F, whereas others (e.g., [32, 33] ) validate their approach via only a limited number of example blocks.
Practical implication.
Our experiments are conducted on a mature theorem prover, and of a practical timing theory that are tailored to the execution context of FBs, whereas some related work does not even have tool support (e.g., [36] ). Our results show that with the assistance of function tables and PVS, verification can be conducted in an industrial context with manageable mathematical artifacts (e.g., background theories, specifications, theorems, proofs, etc.). Nonetheless, there are existing works (e.g., [26] [27] [28] [29] 39, 31, 34] ) that prove certain desired properties of FBs, similar to the additional requirements which we formulate as lemmas. More specifically: 1) work in [29] verifies some behavioural properties written in linear temporal logic; 2) work in [28] verifies the FBs against several safety requirements expressed as invariant properties; 3) work in [39] proves properties using CTL temporal logic based model checking of safety (i.e., boundness), liveness, and fairness; and 4) [32] proves SFC programs against a given set of requirements. However, none of those attempts to provide input-output requirements that are provably complete and disjoint.
Conclusion and future work
Many industrial control systems, especially safety-critical systems, require a high degree of confidence in the safety of the system. For those systems that are based upon PLCs, IEC 61131-3 provides several standard programming languages to describe the behaviour of the implemented function blocks (FBs). Since FBs have been growing in popularity, we present an approach to formalizing and verifying FBs using tabular expressions in the Prototype Verification System (PVS) environment. For STs, we provide a list of translation patterns. For the purpose of our verification, our rules of ST-to-PVS translation are designed to handle only the syntactic constructs of the ST language that are exploited in Annex F. That is, constructs that are supported by the ST language but not used in Annex F of the standard [9] (e.g., CASE statement, WHILE and REPEAT loops, etc.) are not currently handled by our translation rules. As mentioned earlier, our translation is still very useful since the Annex F example function blocks are commonly used in industry. As future work, we intend to extend our translation rules to cover the remaining programming constructs of the ST language, so as to be able to verify FBs using those constructs. For FBDs, we formalize each basic FB as a predicate, allowing for deriving the semantics of composite FBs via logical compositions. More importantly, for demonstrating how we can argue the correctness of the ST and FBD implementations, we provide a black-box input-output requirement specification for each FB in the form of tabular expressions. Finally, as a demonstration of the applicability and value of our methodology, we formally verified the consistency and correctness of the whole FB library in IEC 61131-3 2003 and its informative annex in PVS.
Using our approach, we identified several kinds of potential issues in the FBs in the IEC 61131-3 standard and in the informative annex (Annex F) of the 2003 version: ambiguous block behaviour, missing assumptions, initialization failure, division by zero, mismatched variable types, and erroneous implementations. We provided our suggested solutions for each of these issues to demonstrate that the methodology can help us identify inconsistencies, ambiguities, missing information and even technical errors, that may be difficult or too time consuming to find through manual analysis or by simply examining the FBs in order to understand their behaviour. As indicated, the primary purpose of this work was to demonstrate that this type of formal approach can work on real industrial examples, and that the results are both useful and based on sound principles. As a side benefit, if methodologies like this move into accepted practice, and applied to published libraries of functions and FBs, the FBs in international standards such as IEC 61131-3 could be reused safely in PLC-based control system development, and hardware manufacturers' implementations of the FBs could be tested against the black-box requirement specifications of the FBs. This would strengthen the benefits of being in compliance with such a standard, for developers and manufacturers alike.
In future work, we will extend our list of ST-to-PVS translation patterns to cover more syntactic features. We will also adapt, and possibly extend, the approach for verifying FBs described in another FB related standard, IEC 61499 that fits well with distributed control systems. 
B.2. Output variables
The output EMPTY is a Boolean flag indicating if the current stack is empty. The current stack may be reinitialized (to be an empty stack) by a reset operation (by enabling another Boolean flag R1). When a push operation occurs, as long as there was not previously a stack overflow (i.e., ¬OFLO −1 ), then the stack remains (or becomes) non-empty (i.e., ¬EMPTY). When a pop operation occurs, if the stack was previously left with only one item, then the stack becomes empty (by setting the internal pointer PTR to −1); otherwise, when more than one items were previously left, then the stack remains non-empty.
The output OFLO is a Boolean flag indicating if the current operation has resulted in a stack overflow. Obviously, a stack overflow can occur only when the stack previously reached its maximum capacity NI 18 and a push operation is performed. 18 The internal pointer variable starts at 0, so when it reaches NI −1, the stack is full. Once there is a stack overflow, the value of OFLO holds until a reset operation is requested. Otherwise, the stack remains in its normal state (i.e., ¬OFLO).
The output OUT indicates the top of the stack. The value of OUT is set to 0 when either 1) the stack is reinitialized to be empty; 2) the stack is currently empty; or 3) the current push operation results in a stack overflow. Otherwise, popping from a non-empty stack (with more than one item) results in OUT being set to where the current PTR points to (i.e., STK(PTR)); pushing onto a stack results in OUT being set to the value just added to the stack (i.e., input IN).
